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ABSTRACT 
Vendors, security consultants and information security researchers seek guidance on if and when 
to disclose information about specific software or hardware security vulnerabilities. We apply 
Kantianism to argue that vendors and third parties (InfoSec researchers, consultants, and other 
interested parties) have an ethical obligation to inform customers and business partners (such as 
channel partners or providers of complementary products and services) about specific software 
vulnerabilities (thus addressing if disclosure should occur). We apply Utilitarianism to address 
the question of when disclosure should occur. By applying these two philosophical perspectives 
we conclude that to maximize social welfare, vendors should release software fixes as soon as 
possible, and third parties should adopt a coordinated disclosure policy to avoid placing 
customers and business partners at unnecessary risk. 
Keywords: Information Systems Security, Ethics, Vulnerability Disclosure, Kantianism, 
Utilitarianism 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rarely is software released without defects. An information security (InfoSec) vulnerability is a 
specific type of software defect that enables a malicious agent to undermine the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an IT product or service (device, database, system software, or 
software application). After a vulnerability is identified in an IT product, customers and business 
partners expect the vendor to produce a fix and inform the public about risks they will face if 
they do not install it. If a vendor believes no one else has discovered the vulnerability as yet, 
and/or that it has not yet been maliciously exploited by hackers, they may not feel moral pressure 
to disclose it and provide a fix. Therefore, when and how to inform customers of InfoSec 
vulnerabilities remains an open question. This paper addresses ethical considerations related to 
the disclosure of InfoSec vulnerabilities in hardware and software. 
Organizations that do not disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities place their customers at risk. Because 
no centralized authority governs computer use, significant organizations’ vulnerability disclosure 
policies and procedures vary, and different ethical codes have been adopted by different software 
and equipment vendors, consultants, end users, and researchers (Leiwo and Heikkuri 1998). 
Guidelines suggests that vulnerability disclosure policies should address vendor responsibility 
(ownership and accountability of issues), morality (acting responsibly), trust (instill confidence), 
and ethicality (acting in accordance with principles of right conduct) (Dhillon and Backhouse 
2000). While prior studies have examined InfoSec vulnerability disclosure issues, to our 
knowledge, no paper has done so through the lens of ethical theories. We fill that gap by drawing 
on Kantianism and Utilitarianism to provide ethical guidance to the following research questions: 
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RQ1a: Should organizations publicly disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities in their 
hardware and software products and services? 
RQ1b: If so, how soon should organizations disclose these InfoSec vulnerabilities? 
RQ2a: Should third parties (customers, consultants, security researchers, etc.) who 
become aware of previously-undisclosed nfoSec vulnerabilities publicly 
disclose them? 
RQ2b: If so, how soon should third parties disclose these InfoSec vulnerabilities? 
INFOSEC VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: PRIOR RESEARCH 
If a vendor chooses not to disclose InfoSec vulnerabilities lurking in their products, or not to fix 
them, customers will come to distrust them. Responsible disclosure programs aim to disclose 
vulnerabilities to “the appropriate people, at appropriate times, and through appropriate 
channels” to minimize potential negative impacts to society (Cavusoglu et al. 2005). Yet, how 
and when to disclose vulnerability information is not a straightforward decision. While public 
disclosure increases awareness of a vulnerability (giving customers and business partners an 
opportunity to install a fix or prepare for an attack), disclosure also increases the likelihood that 
malicious agents will learn about the vulnerability and attempt to exploit it. Many vendors 
reportedly release patches before it is socially optimal to do so (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 
2007), and simulations reveal that neither instant disclosure nor secrecy maximizes social 
welfare (Arora et al. 2008). We further note that disclosure of a particular vulnerability does not 
guarantee that all customers and partners will remediate it; some customers will not install a fix 
due to various circumstances. They may have been unable to receive a vendor notification when 
it was distributed, or may not have the expertise to perform the mitigation. Prior economic 
models demonstrated that the risk to marginal customers (the edge case) increases when a 
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vulnerability is announced, even though overall risk to average customers decreases (Choi and 
Fershtman 2005).  
When not legally obliged to reveal an InfoSec vulnerability, an organization may choose not to 
disclose it. Given a choice, managers who only consider the immediate costs of disclosure might 
choose not to disclose it (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2007). Managers have a responsibility to 
‘do no harm’ by avoiding actions that place customers and partners at risk (De George 2008). A 
customer or partner who is not aware of an InfoSec vulnerability will not know that a fix needs 
to be installed, and those who become aware of a vulnerability may lack the influence or power 
to correct the problem (Culnan and Williams 2009).   
KANTIANISM AND UTILITARIANISM 
In Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct, moral requirements are based on reason; an individual who 
acts in a way contrary to reason is behaving immorally (Kant 1785).  Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative—the unconditional requirement for autonomous rational beings to respect others’ 
autonomy—dictates that morals are universal; they must be applied uniformly to all rational 
agents in all situations, regardless of specific features of an individual or of a situation (Kant 
would not be a fan of contingency theories). Building on the requirements that actions be based 
on reason and morals universally applied, Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct further specifies that 
an individual must not treat himself or other human beings solely as a means to an end; morality 
requires us to respect humanity, treating it as an end in itself (Timmons 2012). It is, however, 
acceptable to use another human as a means to an end, so long as the other party gives informed 
consent (not consent based on deception or coercion). The principle of universalizability can be 
applied to test if an action respects others or treats others as a means to an end.  
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Table 1 compares Kantianism versus Utilitarianism, drawing on prior work by Timmons (2012). 




Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct provides guidance for 
judging whether an action is obligatory, wrong, or 
optional (Timmons 2012): 
An action A in circumstance C is obligatory if and only 
if (and because) failing to perform A in C would (from 
among the alternative actions open to one in C) fail to 
respect humanity to a greater degree than would any 
alternative action.  
An action A in C is wrong if and only if (and because) 
performing A would fail to respect someone’s humanity 
to a greater degree than would any other alternative 
action open to one in C.  
An action A in C is optional if and only if (and because) 
either (i) performing A would not fail to respect 
someone’s humanity to a greater degree than would any 
other alternative action open to the agent in C, or (ii) 
neither performing A nor failing to perform A in C 
would involve failing to respect humanity.  
 
 
Mill’s classical view of Utilitarianism provides guidance 
based on the expected utility of a particular action, as 
described by Timmons (2012):  
An action A is obligatory if and only if (and because) A 
would produce a higher level of utility than would any 
other alternative action that the agent could perform 
instead.  
 
An action A is wrong if and only if (and because) A 
would produce less utility than would some other 
alternative action that the agent could perform instead.  
 
 
Utilitarianism is based on the idea that the consequences of an act determine if it was right or 
wrong. Utilitarianism is generally implemented either by evaluating particular acts (act 
utilitarianism) or analyzing codes of conduct (rule utilitarianism). Utilitarianism determines the 
deontic status of an action according to the utility or total net intrinsic value of its consequences 
(Mill 1861).  To evaluate an action and determine the best course of action (priorities) one 
compares the net value of expected outcomes versus expected outcomes from alternative actions; 
the right action is that which yields the highest overall value (or lowest overall negative 
outcome) to individuals. Although Utilitarianism has been criticized as a promoting a philosophy 
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of “the ends justifies the means” (Mingers and Walsham 2010), it continues to exert wide 
influence. For example, utilitarianism underlies the Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM) code of ethics (Walsham 1996), ethical analyses in medicine (Baker and McCullough 
2007; Haynes 2002) and law (Posner 1979). Classical Utilitarianism is less sensitive to 
fundamental rights and justice, which are central to Kant’s theories. By starting our analysis 
through a Kantian lens, we avoid dilemmas in which the greatest good would result from 
behavior that might otherwise be unethical.  
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: ANALYSIS THROUGH TWO LENSES 
Here, we first answer RQ1a and RQ2a from a Kantian perspective. Then, in order to establish 
rules of conduct for the timing of vendors’ vulnerability disclosures, we answer RQ1b and RQ2b 
from the perspective of Utilitarianism. Each moral theory relies on different assumptions, as 
described above. A two-part ethical analysis that starts with Kant avoids a situation in which we 
would guide vendors to take actions which might yield greater good (optimal ends) yet entail 
reprehensible actions (unethical means).  
Kantian Analysis of Vulnerability Disclosure 
In order to consider if a vendor or third party should publically disclose a vulnerability (RQ1a 
and RQ2a), we evaluate vulnerability disclosure from the Kantian perspective. If a hardware or 
software producer knows that an IT product contains a specific vulnerability and does not 
disclose this to customers and business partners, the producer is purposely withholding vital 
information that customers and partners need to make rational decisions about the product, as 
well as to make decisions for protecting various information resources, human resources, and 
other resources. Thus, the act of withholding this information disrespects customers’ and 
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partners’ autonomy; they have been denied information needed to make rational decisions. 
Vendors disclose information about vulnerabilities in their products so that customers and 
business partners can remediate or mitigate the risks associated with a malicious agent exploiting 
them. Open and transparent information about IT products respects users’ autonomy and 
capacity for informed consent (Spinello 2010).  
If a third party discovers the vulnerability, moral guidance is also universally applicable (per 
Kant); the same logic that applies to a vendor applies to a third party. If a vendor has a moral 
obligation to inform a customer or partner about InfoSec vulnerabilities in IT products and 
services (RQ1a), then a third party has the same universally applied obligation (RQ2a).  
Utilitarian Analysis of Vulnerability Disclosure Timing 
In order to consider when an InfoSec vulnerability should be disclosed, we turn to Utilitarianism. 
The goal of this second stage of evaluation is to identify timing choices that minimize the 
aggregate risk to customers and partners.  Figure 1 is a graphical model that represents risk 
associated with a specific vulnerability over time. The risk associated with an unremediated (or 
unmitigated) vulnerability is represented as r. Once customers and partners know about a 
vulnerability, they can address it. Some customers rely on prepaid automated updates that 
immediately fix software related to specific vulnerabilities. Others will not immediately fix their 
software (mitigation will occur at some variable rate). Also, there is residual risk if a 
vulnerability cannot be completely mitigated. Therefore, mitigated risk decreases toward a 
minimum value at a rate of adoption. Our model labels this risk r* and it is represented by the 
Mitigated Risk line. Before an InfoSec vulnerability is publicly disclosed, a vendor and its 
customers and partners face the risk that a malicious agent will independently discover it. Prior 
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research demonstrated this scenario, based on the density and cumulative number of 
vulnerabilities in a software system and the rate of discovery (Alhazmi and Malaiya 2005; 
Anderson 2002; Musa and Okumoto 1984; Rescorla 2005). We model discovery risk d(t) as a 
linear function, indicating that this risk increases every day that third parties (whether malicious 
agents or legitimate security researchers) continue to search for it. This is represented in the 
model by the Actual Risk line.  
Utilitarianism is concerned with the overall net value of an action; therefore, we depict aggregate 
risk across a population of customers. In Figure 1, we graphically show that if a vulnerability is 
known to a vendor but not known publicly, the vendor should wait to disclose it until the point in 
time when mitigated risk is equal to the likelihood that the vulnerability will be independently 
discovered. We label this point A on the model. At this point the risk r* equals d(t) and the risk 
decreases as the vulnerability is mitigated through customers’ and partners’ remediation efforts. 
However, when a vulnerability is known to the vendor but not disclosed to customers  and 
partners (at point B), the net risk for customers is higher than it would have been if the vendor 
disclosed earlier. If the vulnerability is never disclosed and is not remediated, the risk level 
remains at r which represents the probability of an attacker exploiting the vulnerability. 
McLaughlin and Gogan/Why Cooperate? Ethical Analysis of Disclosure 
Proceedings of the Tenth Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Fort Worth, USA, 2015. 8 
 
Figure 1: Aggregate Risk of Vulnerability Disclosure Timelines 
In Figure 1, the difference between r and r* represents the reduction of risk due to disclosure. 
This risk may be immediately reduced through mechanisms such as automatic updates. Risk can 
be further reduced as customers and partners continue to learn about the issue and take care of it 
(such as by upgrading their software to a version where this vulnerability has already been fixed, 
or investing in contingency plans for dealing with the consequences if an unfixed vulnerability is 
exploited). Four different areas of Figure 2 (below) represent varied risk levels. The unshaded 
upper left quadrant represents unrealized risk. The blue upper-right quadrant represents risk due 
to non-optimal or late disclosure (vendor releases a fix after a malicious agent discovers it). 
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Figure 2: Risk Quadrants of Modeled Risk Disclosure 
The gray, bottom-left quadrant of Figure 2 depicts the case in which a vendor discloses the 
vulnerability before its likely independent discovery by a malicious agent. Disclosure is morally 
wrong in the gray and blue areas, since it would place the user population at higher risk (lower 
utility) than the alternative act of non-disclosure. The yellow area represents the mitigated risk 
that customers face due to their ongoing consumption of the product. Here, is where vendors 
ought to disclose IT vulnerabilities.  
DISCUSSION 
Managers aim to make decisions that provide benefits to various stakeholders while remaining 
ethical. Application of Kant’s Theory of Right Conduct reveals that IT product vendors must 
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disclose information about known InfoSec vulnerabilities in their products and services, but it 
does not readily address how quickly a vendor should disclose and remediate a vulnerability. 
More empirical research and simulations are needed to quantify risks of undisclosed 
vulnerabilities under different discovery models. Our model assumes managers and third parties 
will immediately know when one or more malicious agents discover a particular vulnerability 
(point A on Figures 1 and 2). Since information about malicious agents’ knowledge is not always 
known, it follows that vendors should make every effort to fix and disclose vulnerabilities in a 
timely fashion, and vendors should also take steps that aim to motivate customers to install each 
fix. Our model also demonstrates that in order to minimize risk to a population of customers and 
business partners, a third party should only be a first discloser if they can provide a complete fix 
for the vulnerability. Previous studies reported that external pressure (in the form of third party 
disclosures) may motivate organizations to provide timely fixes (Arora et al. 2010). If everyone 
respects humanity as Kant proposed and everyone attempts to minimize the potential for 
negative outcomes (per Utilitarianism), customers and partners would be better off. However, the 
moral compass of managers and external parties doesn’t always point to true north. Therefore, 
third parties who attempt to take the moral high ground regarding vulnerability disclosure must 
work in good faith with one another to produce fixes, make them quickly available to customers 
and business partners, communicate the necessary information to motivate customers to adopt 
the fixes, and refrain from imposing authoritarian timelines. In essence, non-malicious third 
parties and vendors should work together and adopt a policy of coordinated disclosure.   
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